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Summary
One of the key questions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political community, 
raised afresh after every multiparty election since 1990, could be stated as fol-
lows: “How come a majority of the electorate keeps voting for the political 
parties that use a markedly nationalist rhetoric?” The experience with “na-
tional” parties, or more accurately the ethnopolitical experience of the past 
two decades, which in its most radical form has proved to be so destructive 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political community, be it through the atroci-
ties and ravages of war or through more or less subtle forms of discriminatory 
practice, justifies us in rephrasing the question thus: “How come a majority of 
the electorate keeps choosing the worst political option?” The fact is that from 
1990 to 2006, despite their open and often widely expressed contempt for the 
ethnopolitical elites and, which is particularly interesting, “their own” ethno-
political elites at that, once in the privacy of the voting booths on election day, 
the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina still diligently put a cross beside the 
name of “their” national leaders. Why is this? We will be so bold as to claim 
that if there is a consensus about anything at all in this country, there is a gene-
ral consensus that we all know there will be absolutely no change at all. And 
yet, at the very next elections the same voters will hasten to the polling sta-
tion to give their votes to “their” people. The authors inquire into the possible 
answer to this question following the model of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, or the 
Dilemma of Ethnopolitical Prisoner.
Keywords: nationalist parties, ethnopolitical elites, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina
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One of the persistent questions that have puzzled observers of politics in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is the continued electoral support of nationalist parties which both led 
Bosnia and Herzegovina into war and have presided over more than a decade of po-
litical stagnation and economic disaster. Despite their poor performance in govern-
ment and their failure to bring prosperity for more than a decade since the end of the 
war, hopes that early and frequent elections would result in the removal of nationa-
list parties and politicians from positions of power have proven unfounded, as the 
strongest parties in Bosnian elections continue to be those that espouse to represent 
only one of the three “constituent peoples” of Bosnia and base their legitimacy on 
the ability to protect the collective rights of one group in an ongoing political com-
petition with the “other” groups. 
By any measure, the performance of nationalist parties in government in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina must be judged as poor. Unemployment in Bosnia has con-
sistently exceeded 40%. State-wide and sub-state governments have been incre-
dibly slow to pass legislation aimed at improving the overall economic situation and 
encouraging foreign investment, domestic economic growth and development aid. 
Political corruption is widespread and largely out in the open. Furthermore, public 
opinion polls show that voters in Bosnia are abundantly aware of the poor perform-
ance, and have expressed their displeasure in every way but at the ballot box, where 
nationalist parties continue to remain strong. 
Attempts by international organizations engaged in Bosnia to promote multi-
-ethnic parties have been met with only limited and sporadic success, leading to 
consternation that Bosnian voters still prefer politicians and parties who have pro-
ven unable or unwilling to pursue the voters’ best interests as understood by those 
international organizations. In this paper we present an argument for the mecha-
nism whereby nationalist parties have succeeded in maintaining power despite their 
poor performance. We argue that Bosnian voters are not somehow incognizant of 
their own best interests and that instead the details of Bosnia’s electoral system and 
the broader political context create a dilemma for Bosnian voters that leads them to 
choose the nationalist status quo despite the fact that they would prefer a different 
path in Bosnian politics. We present a model of individual vote-decision making 
within the Bosnian context as well as a survey and electoral evidence in support of 
this pattern of voting. 
Since the first democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991, poli-
tics has been characterized by ethnopolitics rather than interest-based politics. The 
result is that political competition for voters has been warped, with the role of vo-
ters reduced to a kind of ethnic census. While the specific leaders and parties do 
change from election to election, the content of the rhetoric employed by victorious 
politicians has not changed. Active efforts to promote less nationalist parties and to 
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hinder more nationalist parties have indeed caused the appearance of political com-
petition, but this has not produced truly moderate or multi-ethnic parties or politics. 
The persistence of ethnopolitics in Bosnia despite the passing of most of the genera-
tion of politicians who were in place during and immediately after the war leads us 
to conclude that the problem lies more directly with the connection between voters 
and elected politicians. The role of voters in holding politicians accountable is being 
thwarted by the persistence of ethnopolitics at the expense of interest-based politics. 
In the following section we present a model that aims to explain the persistent elec-
toral success of ethnopolitical leaders. 
Modelling Bosnian Voting
The dilemma facing Bosnian voters can be represented using a simple game in 
which voters face a simple choice between a candidate from one of the nationalist 
parties and a non-nationalist candidate. The benefit or payoff that the voter receives 
from playing the game of voting depends on his or her vote as well as the actions 
taken by voters from other national groups. Therefore, the individual voter can only 
control his or her vote, but the value of the outcome depends on the actions of vo-
ters from “other” groups. 
We seek to strike a balance between presenting a simple model of vote choice 
and recognizing the complexity of vote choice in any context, and particularly in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Specifically, it is not our intention to treat voters from na-
tional groups as having homogenous preferences. It is not the case that all voters 
within a particular group want the same political outcome. However, we argue that 
there exists a large group of voters who would prefer a non-nationalist outcome in 
Bosnia, but who face a dilemma when voting: should they choose their ‘true’ first 
preference or vote strategically for a second or third option. 
Our game-theoretic model assumes two players: player A, representing the vo-
ters of one national group, and player BC, who represents the voters from the other 
two national groups participating in the election. Each player chooses between vo-
ting for a nationalist candidate and voting for a non-nationalist candidate. There are 
four possible outcomes, which are represented in Figure 1 (on the next page). 
Given these four possible outcomes, the next step is to define which outcomes 
are preferred by each player. Each player’s perception of the value of the four out-
comes shapes the logic of the interaction between the two players and defines which 
“type” of game is being played. We posit that there are two competing “logics” of 
inter-group interaction prevalent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, emerging from diver-
gent conceptions of the possibility for cooperation and compatibility of interests 
between national groups in Bosnia. The first is an ethno-nationalist conception of 
Bosnia that portrays politics as a zero-sum game in which the best outcome for each 
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group can only occur at the expense of other groups. This conception follows the 
logic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The second conception focuses on the simi-
larities of interests between members of each national group and rests on the as-
sumption that the best outcome for each group can be reached through coordination 
with the other groups in order to achieve the best outcome for each group. This se-
cond conception follows the logic of the Assurance game. The ideal choices for vo-
ters depend on their conception of the nature of politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
In the next section, we present rankings of preferences based on each conception.
Ethno-Nationalist Conception (Prisoner’s Dilemma Game)
The ethno-nationalist conception of politics is dominated by the idea that the most 
important political issues are “zero-sum” propositions, meaning that any gain made 
by one side must come at the expense of others. There is no perception that work-
ing together might bring about greater benefits for all, because the political concep-
tion of “nation” is reduced to that of the ethnic group and the citizenry, the group 
of individuals corresponding to the residents of the territory judged to be under the 
control of the state, and has little meaning other than a blanket term for the three 
ethnic groups, plus some largely-ignored “national minorities”. According to the 
ethno-nationalist conception, ethnic communities are viewed as essentialist, abso-
lutist, or perennial entities. Society as a whole is understood as a mosaic of “indi-
vidually homogenous”, self-enclosed mono-cultures, timeless atomic particles that 
exist parallel to one another. In such a conception, the only hope for the establish-
ment of a stable society is the emergence of an equilibrium between the three pre-
supposed, self-enclosed, homogeneous groups that protects the interests between 
the three groups.
This perception prefers collective conceptions of political rights at the expense 
of individual rights, which is a logical result of the idea that the interests of indivi-
duals within a group are homogenous for the most salient political issues. The re-
sult of this conception in an electoral context is that that the Bosnian citizen is valu-
Figure 1. Four Possible Vote Choice Outcomes
Player BC chooses 
non-nationalist
Player BC chooses 
nationalist
Player A chooses 
non-nationalist




Player A chooses 
nationalist
A chooses nationalist /
BC chooses non-nationalist
Both players choose 
nationalist
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able only as a member of his or her ethnic group, and their only political purpose is 
to vote for the representative from his or her ethnic group, thereby maintaining the 
strength of that group against the other national groups in the struggle to protect and 
expand the group’s collective rights. 
The following is a ranking of the four possible outcomes from the perspec-
tive of player A. This ordering as well as the symmetrical ordering for player BC is 
shown in Figure 2 (on the next page). 
Highest Payoff for Player A: Player A votes nationalist while player BC votes non-
-nationalist. (The lower left cell in Figure 2.) Nationalists continue to rule A, plus A 
gets the added benefit of feeling that those in the “wrong” acknowledge their guilt 
by voting against the folks who “started it”. BC is weakened because of group frag-
mentation. Therefore A is able to pursue its goals at the expense of BC. This is the 
worst outcome for player BC. 
Second Highest Payoff for Player A: Player A votes for a non-nationalist party 
and player BC also votes for a non-nationalist party. Both players benefit from turn-
ing away from the violent and unproductive nationalist past, removing the leaders 
who have governed ineffectively for the past decade, and achieving better relations 
with donor countries. However, each of the players must forego the greater benefits 
to be taken at the expense of the other player, even though each player believes that 
such benefits are owed to them. If we consider the interests of both player A and 
player BC, then this is the best joint outcome that can result from the ethno-natio-
nalist conception; however, we assume that each player is pursuing his or her own 
personal interests. 
Third Highest Payoff for Player A: Player A votes for a nationalist party and 
player BC also votes for a nationalist party. The status quo continues. Both sides 
continue to blame the other for political failures. Neither side is seen to admit re-
sponsibility for those failures. Both sides benefit from a sense of “negative justice” 
resulting from the fact that neither side’s situation improves. This outcome is the 
third best option for both players. 
Worst Payoff for Player A. A votes non-nationalist while BC votes national-
ist. Player A is seen to admit responsibility by throwing out his leaders while BC 
sticks with the nationalist status quo. A is weakened because of group fragmenta-
tion, while BC is strengthened, and this allows BC to gain benefits at the expense of 
A. This is the best outcome for BC. 
This ordering of preferences is represented in Figure 2. The numbers assigned 
to each player represent payoffs; thus, 4 is better than 3, and 2 is better than 1. Play-
er A prefers most the bottom left outcome, while player BC prefers most the out-
come in the top right cell. 
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Figure 2. Prisoner’s Dilemma Game of Vote Choice 
with Payoffs for Each Player
Player BC chooses 
non-nationalist
Player BC chooses 
nationalist
Player A chooses non-nationalist A=3, BC=3 A=1, BC=4
Player A chooses nationalist A=4, BC=1 A=2, BD=2
Given these choices, how should player A and player BC vote? These types of 
games are solved by looking for a dominant strategy. Player A does not know what 
BC will do, so player A evaluates which choice benefits him or her most for each of 
the choices that BC can make. If player BC chooses non-nationalist, then player A 
should choose nationalist, in order to take advantage of BC’s weakness and get the 
best possible outcome (4). If player BC chooses nationalist, player A should play 
nationalist in order to avoid the worst outcome (1). This means that player A’s domi-
nant strategy is to vote nationalist regardless of what BC does. BC faces the same 
choice and has the same dominant strategy. Therefore we would expect both players 
to choose nationalist, and thus receive each player’s third-best choice. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma draws so much interest because it includes an illustra-
tion of a situation in which players playing their dominant strategies end up with a 
less than optimal outcome. The best joint outcome is to cooperate and receive each 
player’s second-best outcome. However, each player faces the temptation to cheat 
and get the best outcome, and faces the risk that the other player will do the same. 
The result is that the players play it safe and each receives a poor outcome. 
In the ethno-nationalist conception of politics, voters risk the interests of their 
entire ethnic group when they choose to vote for multi-ethnic parties, because it 
weakens the overall strength of their group as opposed to the other groups. Vo-
ting behavior is driven by fear of finding one’s self on the wrong side of a zero-sum 
game and living under the domination of other national groups. 
Civic Conception (Assurance Game)
The alternative to the ethno-national conception of Bosnian politics is the concep-
tion which eschews collectivist modes of thought for individualist, liberal ideas. 
The key point is that the most salient political issues do not lend themselves to eth-
nic groups as a vehicle for political representation, because the voters’ interests are 
not homogenous within ethnic groups. In fact, voters within a group may very well 
have interests more similar to some members of another ethnic group with the same 
position in society, or who reside in the same geographic location, than individuals 
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within his or her own group. This conception does not deny the importance of eth-
nic group identity in Bosnian politics, but portrays issues directly linked to ethnicity 
as a small portion of a larger set of important political issues. 
The logic that is the basis for civic or multi-ethnic parties takes a different 
shape than that of ethno-politics. Instead of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it more closely 
resembles the Assurance game, which is a coordination game instead of a coopera-
tion game (like the Prisoner’s Dilemma). The crucial difference is that both indi-
viduals’ best outcome can be reached jointly. The payoffs are described in the next 
section and represented in Figure 3 (on the next page). 
Highest Payoff: Player A votes for a non-nationalist party and player BC also votes 
for a non-nationalist party. Both players benefit from turning away from the violent 
nationalist past, removing the leaders who have governed ineffectively for the past 
decade, and achieving better relations with donor countries. According to the civic 
conception, this is the best outcome for both player A and player BC. 
Second Highest Payoff: Player A votes for a nationalist party and player BC 
also votes for a nationalist party. The status quo continues. Both sides continue to 
blame the other for political failures. Neither side is seen to admit responsibility for 
those failures. Both sides benefit from a sense of “negative justice” resulting from 
the fact that neither side’s situation improves. 
Third Highest Payoff for Player A: Player A votes nationalist while player BC 
votes non-nationalist. Nationalists continue to rule A, plus A gets the added benefit 
of feeling that those in the “wrong” acknowledge their guilt by voting against the 
folks who “started it”. BC is weakened because of group fragmentation. 
Worst Payoff for Player A: Player A votes non-nationalist, while BC votes na-
tionalist. Player A is seen to admit responsibility by throwing out his leaders, while 
BC sticks with the nationalist status quo. A is weakened because of group fragmen-
tation.
BC’s Payoffs Are Symmetric to Those of A. The resulting game can be repre-
sented as a simple assurance game. Here, we have assigned values to each of the 
outcomes, with 4 being the best outcome for each player and 1 being the worst out-
come for each player. 
What should each player do when faced with these choices? From player A’s per-
spective, the best choice when player BC chooses non-nationalist is to also vote 
non-nationalist. The best choice when player BC votes nationalist is to also vote 
nationalist. The result is a so-called mixed strategy. Player A’s choice depends on 
what he or she expects player BC to do. There is no dominant strategy (meaning 
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that the same choice is most beneficial no matter what the other player does) as in 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. 
The best outcome for both players is to choose non-nationalist parties while 
the other player also chooses non-nationalist parties. The worst outcome for each 
player is to choose non-nationalist parties while the other side chooses nationalist. 
Therefore for each player, voting non-nationalist is a very risky choice to make. It 
can result in the best outcome, but it can also result in the worst outcome. Addition-
ally, the difference between the worst outcome and the best outcome is beyond the 
players’ control, because the outcome depends not only on his or her choice but on 
the action taken by the other player. 
For each player, choosing nationalist is less risky, because it removes the possi-
bility that they will end up with the worst option. If player A chooses nationalist, then 
the worst that can happen is that he gets the second worst option and the best that can 
happen is that he gets the second best outcome, which is the current status quo. 
So, voters who see voting from the civic perspective in Bosnian elections face 
a choice between a risky vote for non-nationalist parties and a less risky vote for na-
tionalist parties. Given this choice, the crucial factor becomes each player’s belief 
about what the other player will do. Since they vote at the same time, it is impos-
sible to know for sure for whom the other player will vote, so the voter must act on 
his or her belief about the likelihood that the other player will choose nationalist or 
non-nationalist. 
In the simplified example in Figure 3, player A values the best option four 
times more than the worst option (4:1) and twice as much as the second worst op-
tion (4:2). Given the value of these outcomes, player A should choose to vote non-
-nationalist if he or she believes that there is a greater than 50% chance that the 
other player will also vote non-nationalist. Conversely, it is in player A’s best inter-
ests to vote nationalist when he or she believes that there is a less than 50% chance 
of player BC voting non-nationalist. The critical percentage above which a player 
should choose non-nationalist depends not only on how he or she ranks the four 
Figure 3. Assurance Game of Vote Choice 
with Payoffs for Each Player
Player BC chooses 
non-nationalist
Player BC chooses 
nationalist
Player A chooses non-nationalist A=4, BC=4 A=1, BC=2
Player A chooses nationalist A=2, BC=1 A=3, BD=3
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possible outcomes, but also on the relative value that he or she places on them. So, 
a player A who valued the best outcome eight times more than the second best out-
come (instead of only thirty-three percent as presented above), should choose non-
-nationalist parties even when he or she believes that the other side will vote non-
-nationalist less than 50% of the time.
Based on the civic model, we see that it is possible for Bosnian voters to prefer 
a change from the current context and desire to remove ineffective politicians but 
still find it in their best interest to vote for incumbent nationalists because of their 
belief that the other side will vote nationalist. So, persistent success on the part of 
nationalist political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina does not necessarily mean 
that Bosnian voters all subscribe to the ethno-nationalist view of Bosnian politics 
and certainly not that the ethno-nationalist viewpoint is correct. Instead, models 
based on the two conceptions of Bosnian politics produce similar or even identi-
cal electoral results, depending on the other assumptions we make about the beliefs 
held by voters. 
Two Kinds of Beliefs
When choosing whether to vote for a nationalist or a non-nationalist candidate, vo-
ters in Bosnia and Herzegovina must make two assessments of the political sphere. 
First, they must decide for themselves whether political competition is truly a ze-
ro-sum game as the ethnopolitics conception says, or the greatest benefits for their 
group will result from cooperation. Second, if they believe that the greatest benefits 
accrue from cooperation, they must then discern whether the “other” groups have 
also been won over to the civic identity, as the payoffs depend not only on their own 
actions, but also on the actions of the other players. 
So, were do these beliefs about the broader political situation and the actions of 
other voters come from? The expectations that citizens have about the other players 
are a result of a broader process of interactions between groups in society during the 
period between and leading up to elections. The beliefs that voters hold are influ-
enced by what they see in the media and in their everyday lives. The media in Bos-
nia are still largely fragmented along ethnic lines, in which the ethnopolitical elite 
of each constituent group retains control over newspapers and television stations.
The model of voting listed above takes political parties as options for voters 
rather than as strategic actors themselves. However, political parties play a strong 
role in shaping voters’ beliefs about the state of the political system and the inten-
tions of other actors. This shaping takes place in the following ways: parties go 
about interacting with one another when in office and they seek to mobilize voters to 
give their support during election campaigns. If politicians treat the political sphere 
as an ethnic, zero-sum game, then voters will be more likely to do so as well. 
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Our theoretical approach shows that nationalist parties benefit from the politi-
cal climate that they create, insofar as it leads voters to believe that political life in 
Bosnia is and should be dominated by ethnic division and not based on interest poli-
tics. Because of their incumbent status and influence over media outlets, the parties 
of the ethnopolitical elite have both the incentive and the means to shape the politi-
cal climate in Bosnia according to their needs. 
Candidates from nationalist parties are able to shape the voters’ beliefs about 
the electoral system in their characterization of other national groups as well as in 
their choice of electoral issues. Nationalist politics is characterized by references to 
events in the past where there was tension and violence between national groups, 
and by relating those past events to current politics. Nationalist politicians are most 
successful when they choose issues that appear to be “zero-sum” in nature. In Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, these zero-sum issues most frequently take the form of calls 
for fundamental changes to the territorial division of the country or constitutional 
changes that effect the impact of that territorial division. When a Croat politician 
calls for a “third entity”, a Serb politician calls for the secession of Republika Srp-
ska from Bosnia and Herzegovina, or even when a Bosniak politician calls for the 
abolition of the entity system, they are each drawing attention to zero-sum issues 
which follow the logic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Essentially, nationalist parties 
thrive on permanent government crisis, or at least the threat of crisis around election 
time, as the basis of their legitimacy. 
In the scenario described above, it is possible that the political leadership in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is out of line with the preferences of the electorate, yet con-
tinues to receive election results that reaffirm their ethnopolitical regime. Despite 
this disconnection, nationalist parties manage to remain in power through skillfully 
conducted election campaigns in a broader context of hate speech and exclusivity 
that spread distrust and emphasize that survival itself is at risk. In doing so, nationa-
list politicians convince voters of the ethnopolitical conception of politics, thereby 
ensuring their own political survival. The task facing non-nationalist parties is made 
much more difficult by the fact that they must not only convince voters that politics 
is not a zero-sum game, but also that the other groups as well accept the civic con-
ception. A truly daunting task, given the rhetoric of nationalist parties. 
If the nationalists’ success at convincing voters that politics is essentially eth-
nic can explain their electoral wins, why do we bother presenting the civic, as-
surance model at all? Firstly, we do so because there is evidence that such a civic 
identity did and does exist for many Bosnian voters, and such an identity appears 
to be the best hope for overthrowing the ethnopolitical elite and bringing about true 
political competition in Bosnia. Secondly, our explanation of the civic, assurance 
model demonstrates how difficult it will be for even one of the national groups to 
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choose non-nationalist politicians. This difficulty emerges from the logic of the as-
surance model, in which it is in the voters’ best interests to choose non-nationalist 
parties only when they expect that the other groups will also choose non-national-
ist. Since, under the nationalist, Prisoner’s Dilemma conception of politics, voters 
have a dominant strategy to vote nationalist, for voter A to vote nationalist, he or 
she must not only adopt the civic, assurance conception but must believe that voter 
BC has also adopted the civic conception. This sequence of choices is summarized 
in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Beliefs and Vote Choice
If ethno-nationalist, will 
the other voter choose 
nationalist or civic?
If they vote nationalist, 
I should vote nationalist





If civic, will the other voter 
choose nationalist or civic?
If they vote nationalist, 
I should vote nationalist
If they vote civic, I should 
vote civic
A corollary to the conclusions reached using the assurance models is that na-
tionalist politicians are most likely to remain in office when voters believe that vo-
ters from other groups will also vote nationalist. Therefore, it is in the interest of na-
tionalist politicians to continue to foster an environment of mistrust and animosity. 
In fact, evidence suggests that nationalist parties who attempt to moderate run the 
risk of being ousted from office by other parties who take advantage and themselves 
“out-national” the nationalists. 
Empirical Section
The voting model presented in the previous section helps to explain some of the 
most important electoral outcomes in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the advent of 
competitive elections including the first round of competitive elections in 1990, the 
formation of the Alliance for Change following the elections in 2000, and the pat-
tern of electoral support for non-nationalist parties since the collapse of the Alliance 
for Change in 2002. 
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Defining Non-Nationalist Parties
First, it is necessary to define non-nationalist parties in the Bosnian context. In ge-
neral, there are two types of non-nationalist parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
multi-ethnic parties that have attempted to win votes from more than one national 
group and non-nationalist parties that have not attempted to gain voters from mul-
tiple national groups but whose rhetoric and behavior is more consistent with co-
operation and compromise as opposed to division. 
Multi-ethnic parties face a difficult task in Bosnia’s fragmented electoral sys-
tem in which the majority of elections take place either in constituencies that have 
only one national group or are intended to fill political mandates that are explicitly 
assigned to one national group. SDP-BiH is one of only a few political parties that 
has succeeded in attracting voters from more than one national group in Bosnia, 
although the support for SDP outside of Bosniak voters has been very limited.1 
SDP was championed by international organizations working in Bosnia as the party 
most consistent with the aims of the international community in Bosnia, but overt 
international support for SDP has receded since its participation in the Alliance for 
Change government. 
While SDP is the strongest multi-ethnic party, it is not the only party that at-
tempts to garner support from more than one ethnic group. A variety of smaller 
parties also have multi-ethnic agendas and membership, but few have significant 
support. Two parties, Radom za Boljitak (Work for Improvement) and LDS (Liberal 
Democratic Party) have shown improvement over the last two election cycles but 
do not yet have broad support. 
For this paper, we choose to focus on the choice to vote for truly multi-eth-
nic parties as opposed to mono-ethnic parties with a more moderate rhetoric. This 
choice is largely practical, as mono-ethnic parties have not been consistent in their 
commitment to moderation, as evidenced by the political course chosen by SNSD 
and SBiH. 
Bosnia’s First Elections
One key part of the collapse of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the 
subsequent war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the emergence of nationalist par-
ties as the dominant electoral force in Bosnian politics. As in the other former Yu-
1 The most obvious exception is the election of SDP candidate Zeljko Komsic as the Croat mem-
ber of the BiH Presidency. Komsic’s election was made possible largely by a split in the Croat 
Nationalist Party, HDZ. There is also widespread speculation that large numbers of non-nation-
alist Bosniak voters supported Komsic because he had a much better chance of winning than the 
SDP candidate running for the Bosniak seat of presidency. The BiH Constitution allows residents 
of the Federation entity to vote for either the Bosniak or Croat member of BiH Presidency. 
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goslav republics, nationalist parties won an overwhelming victory in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; however, there is reason to believe that such an outcome was not in-
evitable. 
For each of the other republics, there was a so-called titular nation based on 
some sort of ethnic identity. Slovenes constitute the overwhelming majority in Slo-
venia just as Croats form the majority in Croatia. There was little conflict between 
concepts of ethnic and civic identity, as they were largely coterminous (obviously 
the large Serb enclaves in Croatia are a significant exception). Given the nature of 
political competition between republics during the final decade of Yugoslavia, it is 
hardly surprising that the first competitive elections in Slovenia and Croatia took 
the form of competition between nationalist parties claiming to represent the inte-
rests of the titular nation of each republic and parties that favored maintaining the 
Yugoslav federation. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina did not have a titular na-
tion with a clear majority of voters. For Bosnia, the election did not have to be cast 
as a choice between Yugoslavia and nationalism. There was the third option of an 
independent Bosnia with a civic nation that included Bosnian Serbs, Croats and 
Bosniaks as well as other groups in society that did not fit well into the three catego-
ries (most obviously individuals resulting from the widespread “mixed” marriages 
in Bosnia’s urban centers). 
There is evidence that this third, civic option had some chance of becoming re-
ality. Surveys carried out one year prior to the elections in 1990 showed widespread 
support for non-nationalist parties. What changed during the intervening year? Our 
analysis argues for two primary factors: the campaign itself and the outcomes of 
elections in other republics. 
One must remember that the key factors in the vote choice we present concern 
beliefs about the nature of inter-group political competition and beliefs about the 
likely voting actions of other groups. Given the exclusion of religion and ethnic 
identity from public life under communism, it is hardly surprising that the leaders 
of nationalist parties would be particularly radical. The din of competing nationalist 
claims cast into doubt the pre-election consensus that interethnic relations in Bos-
nia were based on consensus and cooperation rather than conflict. This effect would 
have been magnified with rural voters from mono-ethnic areas who could have no 
intense personal contact with individuals of other groups, which would have served 
to counter the notion that inter-group relations constituted a zero-sum conflict over 
resources and power. The success of nationalist parties in Slovenia and Croatia 
as well as the violence that followed the two republics’ secession attempts only 
strengthened the notion that nationalist politics was in ascension. Even the voters in 
Bosnia who held a civic worldview would have felt pressure to vote for nationalist 
parties because of the expectation that members of the other groups would adopt the 
nationalist conception of politics. 
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The Alliance for Change
The most significant victory for non-nationalist parties came in the November 2000 
elections, or rather in the coalition-forming process following the elections. Fol-
lowing modest gains for multiethnic and moderate nationalist parties in the elec-
tions, international organizations put immense pressure on Bosnian political leaders 
to form governments at the Federation and State levels that excluded the strongest 
war-time nationalist parties. The limited gains during the 2000 elections marked the 
first time that parties other than the war-time parties had enough of a presence in 
legislatures to make that possible. However, there was not enough support for mul-
ti-ethnic parties to form a coalition without including moderate nationalist parties, 
most significantly SNSD and SBiH which, while more moderate, had strong ties to 
the war-time nationalist parties. 
It is important to note that non-nationalist parties were only successful among 
Bosniak voters, and made almost no headway among Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian 
Croats. The success of SDP was limited even among Bosniak voters. The Alliance 
for Change only emerged because of the electoral gains of relatively moderate na-
tionalist parties like SNSD and SBiH and pressure from the international commu-
nity in Bosnia that encouraged those moderate nationalist parties to form coalitions 
with multi-ethnic parties rather than with hard-line nationalist parties. The actions 
of the international community in the period leading up to and after the election in-
fluenced the voters’ choices by altering the payoffs expected from non-nationalist 
voting as well as the expectations they held about the actions of the other national 
groups. The international community restricted the funding sources of hard-line 
nationalist parties, actively campaigned for more moderate and non-nationalist par-
ties, and promised benefits should their preferred parties be elected. After the elec-
tion, international officials put pressure on elected politicians to form coalitions of 
moderate nationalist and non-nationalist parties. 
Among Bosniak voters, the actions of the international community succeed-
ed in convincing some voters both of the civic conception and that the potential 
benefits of non-nationalist voting outweighed the risk that the other two national 
groups would not also choose non-nationalist parties. In fact, Bosnian Croats and 
Bosnian Serbs did not choose non-nationalist parties, and in the succeeding elec-
tions support for SDP among Bosniaks declined, perhaps indicating a drop in con-
fidence on the part of Bosniak voters that the other groups would also choose non-
-nationalist. 
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Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Is there any hope that the cycle of nationalist voting can be broken? The outlook is 
grim, because with each passing election the problem gets worse instead of better. 
Given that the problem is driven by the context in which voters perceive themselves 
to be, continued dominance by nationalist parties only reinforces the belief in the 
ethno-nationalist conception as well as the belief that the other groups will continue 
to vote for nationalist parties. As parties in power, the nationalist parties themselves 
are in the best position to make the changes necessary to break the cycle, but they 
benefit from the status quo. 
Since the outcomes in the games depicted above are dependent on the players’ 
cooperation and coordination with one another, most solutions involve issues of 
communication and trust between players. In both the Prisoner’s Dilemma and As-
surance games, players can achieve an outcome working together that is preferable 
to the outcome when both choose not to cooperate. Unfortunately, communication 
and trust are difficult enough between individuals and infinitely more problematic 
between groups of individuals during an election campaign in a country less than 15 
years removed from a civil war. 
The most direct way to challenge nationalist parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
would be to make changes in the electoral system, most likely a preferential voting 
scheme, which would strengthen parties who appeal to voters from multiple nation-
al groups while punishing nationalist parties that could only appeal to their group 
of voters. Such a scheme would strengthen both multi-national parties and more 
moderate nationalist parties. The current electoral system is openly hostile to multi-
-ethnic parties, as a large number of positions up for election, either by design or by 
the ethnic composition of the electoral constituency, involve candidates and voters 
from only one ethnic group. Preferential voting gives voters both a say in “their” 
group’s election but also in the election of other groups’ candidates. Such a system 
makes nationalist rhetoric less politically desirable and expands the constituency to 
which politicians must appeal, while also de-emphasizing the collectivist aspects of 
the constitution. 
This paper offers some hope that the nationalism that has dominated Bosnian 
politics since the first free elections does not circumscribe Bosnia’s political future. 
While the power of ethno-nationalism in Bosnia’s recent past and present cannot 
be denied, the electoral success of nationalist parties does not necessarily mean that 
there is no possibility for a resurgence of non-nationalist, multi-ethnic politics in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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OBJAŠNJENJE USPJEHA NACIONALISTIČKIH STRANAKA 
U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI
Sažetak
Jedno od ključnih pitanja u pogledu bosanskohercegovačke političke zajed-
nice koje se postavlja nakon svakih višestranačkih izbora od 1990. moglo bi 
se ovako formulirati: “Kako to da većina izbornog tijela uvijek glasa za poli-
tičke stranke koje se služe izrazito nacionalističkom retorikom?” Oboružani 
dvadesetogodišnjim iskustvom s “nacionalnim” strankama ili, točnije, etno-
političkim iskustvom koje se, u svome najradikalnijem obliku, pokazalo vrlo 
destruktivnim za političku zajednicu Bosne i Hercegovine – bilo ratnim stra-
hotama i pustošenjem bilo više ili manje suptilnim oblicima diskriminacije – 
možemo ga i preformulirati: “Kako to da većina izbornog tijela uvijek izabire 
najgoru političku opciju?” Činjenica je da građani Bosne i Hercegovine od 
1990. do 2006, čim se na dan izbora nađu na glasačkome mjestu, unatoč otvo-
renu i često jasno izraženu preziru prema etnopolitičkim elitama (osobito je 
zanimljivo da u to uključuju i “vlastite”) ipak predano stavljaju križić uz ime 
“svojih” nacionalnih lidera. Koji je razlog tome? Usudit ćemo se ustvrditi da 
u ovoj zemlji, ako uopće i o čemu postoji konsenzus, ponajprije postoji kon-
senzus o tome da svi znamo kako se baš ništa neće promijeniti. A ipak, već na 
idućim izborima isti ti glasači požurit će da daju glas “svome” narodu. Autori 
istražuju moguće odgovore na to pitanje prema modelu Zarobljenikove dile-
me ili Dileme etnopolitičkoga zarobljenika.
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